The flaw in "All resources" policies
An administrator who targets "All resources" in a Conditional Access policy while including even one application exclusion creates a massive security hole. If an administrator targets "All resources" but excludes a single application, Entra ID issues tokens for low-privilege baseline scopes such as User.Read, openid, profile, or email to any resource without enforcing the policy’s grant controls. An attacker with a stolen password uses a trusted first-party client like Microsoft Bing Search to obtain a Microsoft Graph token and enumerate directory objects. This bypass succeeds because the sign-in result reports "notApplied" for the MFA grant control rather than a failure. I find that these configuration gaps create massive holes in identity security. You should review your current policies to see if any "All resources" rules include application exclusions.
The Microsoft 365 Message Center provides additional details to help customers prepare for enforcement changes scheduled for June 15, 2026. Another frequent error involves configuring MFA for a specific security group instead of "All users." If a new user or guest account does not belong to that group, the policy provides no protection. I see many administrators overlook this, especially when they want to minimize disruption for certain teams.
Bypassing device compliance with phantom registrations
The Device Registration Service (DRS) endpoint lacks protection in enforcement mode, which allows attackers to authenticate through a path that Conditional Access does not block. The DRS API validates tokens but does not verify that the caller is a real Windows machine. Researchers from Cyderes demonstrated that an attacker can register a phantom device using a signed Azure AD certificate and a private key without needing physical hardware or a TPM. This allows the attacker to generate a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) that carries cryptographic device claims. Because the fake device returns empty values during the check, Intune marks the device as compliant instead of non-compliant, which allows attackers to bypass multi-factor authentication and device compliance rules and maintain access to the directory graph. Since August 2024, the Russian state-aligned threat actor Storm-2372 has exploited this specific gap to target critical infrastructure globally.
Attackers also exploit the way Intune handles hybrid domain-joined devices. By declaring a fake hybrid domain membership during enrollment, attackers can bypass Intune restrictions entirely. Once they achieve compliance, they access the Intune Management Extension to download enterprise applications. This provides them with internal server hostnames and administrative share structures. Attackers can even store a Primary Refresh Token in a plaintext file on a simple Linux laptop. Will Microsoft eventually make baseline scope enforcement mandatory for all tenants?
Deployment mistakes and management
Effective policy management requires using "Report-only" mode before enforcing new rules. Administrators who skip this step prevent understanding the impact on user productivity and can lead to accidental lockouts. Organizations also fail to exclude at least two cloud-only emergency access accounts from all Conditional Access policies. Without these break-glass accounts, a misconfiguration can leave the organization without any way to access the tenant.
I also notice admins frequently ignore the need to block legacy authentication protocols like SMTP AUTH, POP3, and IMAP because these protocols do not support MFA. While Microsoft reports that MFA blocks over 99.9% of account compromise attacks, many organizations leave these legacy paths open for compatibility reasons. To prevent this, administrators should use FIDO2 security keys or the Microsoft Authenticator app.
| Risk Factor | Mitigation Strategy |
|---|---|
| Resource Exclusion Bypass | Enable baseline scope enforcement |
| Phantom Device Registration | Use strict external validation |
| Legacy Authentication | Block protocols via Conditional Access |
| Administrative Lockout | Exclude break-glass accounts |
