Resilience Month and current alert limitations
CISA observes Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Month this November. The agency asks everyone to "Resolve to be Resilient" by investing in planning and exercises today. The Presidential Proclamation issued yesterday calls on Americans to recognize the importance of this month to enhance national security. Organizations should identify critical functions, define dependencies, and consider the full range of threats to maintain functional continuity. They should also perform dedicated resilience planning, determine maximum acceptable downtime for customers, and test those plans under real-life conditions. While CISA promotes these defensive practices, the Cybersecurity Advisory Committee (CSAC) released findings this week regarding an overhaul of how the government communicates threat levels. The CSAC subcommittee found that the current array of reports lacks authority, coherence, and singular curation. These reports fail to provide an understanding of shifts in threat types or national cyber risk. I see a significant gap in the agency’s current ability to manage such a system because CISA lacks the analytical capacity and unique data sources required to field a national cybersecurity alert system reliably.
A tiered alert model
The CSAC subcommittee proposes a National Cybersecurity Alert System to provide actionable, granular information through a routinized 24/7 process. This proposed system would move away from the current uncoordinated reports toward a more authoritative model. The subcommittee suggests a tiered model where certain alerts remain non-public and only reach specific parties. The new rules from the SEC and CIRCIA will provide the data needed to help the government determine when specific attacks like ransomware increase or decrease.
| Alert System Feature | Current CISA Reports | Proposed National System |
|---|---|---|
| Information Type | Specific threats and advisories | National risk levels |
| Coordination | Uncoordinated and disparate | Curated and authoritative |
| Response Model | Reactive and ad-hoc | Routinized 24/7 |
The plan relies on the agency’s ability to marry data from the CIRCIA framework with information on rising or falling threat levels. You know that the SEC reporting rules differ from CIRCIA because they inform TTPs and help scope the alert system. The subcommittee expects these new data streams to offer more granularity and authoritativeness for organizations. The committee also points to the 2022 "Shields Up" program as an example of how specific, time-delimited warnings provide value to defenders. Does the agency have the resources to implement this without further depleting its existing staff?
Workforce cuts and detection gaps
The agency faces steep challenges in managing new alert responsibilities due to a planned reduction of up to 1,300 people. This workforce cut affects about half of CISA’s full-time staff and 40 percent of its contractors. The National Risk Management Center and the Stakeholder Engagement Division expect large cuts. These reductions occur while red-team assessments expose how easily attackers penetrate critical infrastructure. In one assessment of a government services and facilities entity, the red team gained initial access through a web application with default credentials and sent phishing emails to compromise four workstations. Using a modified Bloodhound collector, the team scraped Active Directory data, exploited a default Machine Account Quota of 10 to add computer accounts, and leveraged misconfigured Active Directory Certificate Service templates to request certificates for newly created machine accounts. The team then harvested cleartext credentials and long-lived AWS IAM keys to obtain administrative access to multiple sensitive business systems and cloud resources without any defensive intervention. Organizational silos and untuned detection tools contributed to this failure. I find the lack of defensive intervention in the face of such lateral movement unacceptable. In a separate assessment of a Water and Wastewater Systems sector entity, defenders detected the initial compromise attempts, isolated the affected systems, and forced the red team into an assume-breach model. This successful containment happened because the team identified activity when the red team moved laterally to a bastion host in the OT demilitarized zone. The Treasury breach also shows these persistent vulnerabilities, as a compromise of privileged user credentials exposed gaps in the ability of federal systems to withstand sophisticated cyberattacks.
